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After being largely symbolic  for almost two decades,  Indonesian  minimum  wages were
tripled in nominal  terms,  and doubled  in real terms, in the first half of the 1990s. Several  reasons
are usually  mentioned  to explain such a dramatic shift in labor  market policies. Some observers
point out to the role of international  pressures,  particularly  out of concerns  by US consumers  and
union members  that Indonesia  was violating  workers' rights. In 1991,  a well-known  American
shoe firm sourcing a large share of its worldwide  production  out of Indonesia  was accused of
benefiting  from a degree of labor exploitation  that would be considered unacceptable  in any
industrial  country. In the following  years, several complaints  were filed under the Generalized
Scheme  of Preferences  to deprive  Indonesia  of low tariffs on its exports to the US market. The
withdrawal of  investment guarantees to US companies that would ensue was a  threat of
potentially  greater  significance.
Domestic forces can also  underlie the  sudden increase in minimum wages.  The
government  of Indonesia  was genuinely  concerned  that workers were not sharing the fruits of
economic growth.  In spite of an outstanding  economic  performance,  wages were (rightly or
wrongly)  perceived  as lagging  behind,  due to the vast supply of labor  coming out of rural areas.
As the country approached the 50th anniversary  of its independence,  the inability to make
workers benefit from sustained  growth  appeared  as a short-coming  that needed to be explicitly
addressed. Also, there was a sense that industrial  relations could follow the same path as in
Korea, where the labor  movement  became  increasingly  sour as workers  felt prosperity  was being
attained on their back. Given the extreme  political  violence  Indonesia  experienced  in the 1960s,
possible labor  unrest was a legitimate  source  of concern.Whatever the  actual reasons underlying the  change in  labor market policies, the
minimum  wage hike was dramatic enough  to raise doubts  on its merits. The economic  boom of
recent years was heavily dependent on exports of labor-intensive  products, such as textiles,
garments,  footwear  and electronics. These industries,  which were attracted to Indonesia partly
because of low labor costs, could now face an incentive  to relocate abroad. Even if existing
firms did not relocate, new investments  could be channeled  to countries offering lower wages,
such as Bangladesh  or Vietnam. Moreover,  for those firmns  staying  in Indonesia,  the increase in
labor costs could encourage the adoption of less labor-intensive  technologies. Although some
claim it is time for Indonesia  to move up the ladder,  and not to base comparative  advantage on
cheap labor  anymore,  prospects  could  be bleak for low-skill  workers.
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the impact of  the minimum wage hike on wage
earnings,  wage employment  and investment  in Indonesia,  in the first half of the 1990s. While
economic  theory sheds some light on the effects of raising the minimum  wage, there is no clear
consensus  on the actual  orders  of magnitude,  or even on the signs,  of some of these effects. Few
would consider  that all workers  stand to gain (or to lose, for that matter) from higher minimum
wages, so that the problem is rather to put the gains and losses in balance.  The resulting
estimates,  in turn, may help deciding  whether  minimum  wages are "too" high, and which criteria
should be used to revise them over time. Needless to say, any attempt to produce estimates of
this  sort  is at  best tentative.  Data are always partial and scattered, while all empirical
methodologies  are subject  to criticism. But in spite of these obvious  shortcomings,  some insight
can still be gained  from an empirical  approach  to the minimum  wage issue.
This paper applies relatively simple statistical tools to both individual  and aggregate
data. Visual inspection  of the wage distribution  for full-time laborers  and employees is used to
assess the extent of compliance  with minimum  wages. A low percentage  of earnings  below the
2legal  minimum,  and  some  clustering  of these  earnings  at  or  around  the  minimum,  can  be
interpreted as evidence that the minimum wage is binding.  The larger the distortion of the wage
distribution, the  more  likely that  minimum  wage policies will affect  labor market  outcomes.
Regression analysis involving "minimalist"  specifications and data aggregated at the provincial
level  is  used,  in  turn,  to  estimate  the  elasticity  of  wage  earnings,  wage  employment  and
investment  with  respect  to  the  minimum  wage.  Indeed,  one  of  the  interesting  features  of
Indonesia  is the  wide variation  of legal minimum wages  and  actual  labor market  conditions
across its 27 provinces.  This variation allows to identify the effects of the minimum wage, much
the same as variation across the 50 states allows it in the US.
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section describes the Indonesian minimum
wage  policy,  compares  minimum  wage  levels to  the  average  earnings  and  productivity  of
different sub-sets of workers, evaluates whether provincial minimum wage levels are affected by
local  labor  market  conditions  and  discusses  the  effectiveness  of  enforcement  mechanisms.
Section  3 presents  the theoretical  debate on the  consequences of raising the  minimum  wage,
reviews  the  empirical  evidence  from  other  countries,  both  industrial  and  developing,  and
summarizes the existing knowledge on this issue in the case of Indonesia.  The following section
uses  data on  individual earnings to evaluate whether minimum  wages bite;  in the process,  it
highlights  wide disparities  by  province, gender, age group  and  sector of activity.  Section  5
discusses  the empirical methodology used to identify the effects of the minimum wage,  taking
advantage  of the  wide cross-province  variation in the  data.  This methodology  is applied  in
section 6 to the estimation of the overall impact of minimum wage hikes on the earnings of urban
laborers and employees,  as well as on wages in manufacturing.  Based on the same approach,
Section  7  evaluates  the  elasticity  of wage  employment  with  respect  to the  minimum  wage,
providing  separate estimates  for young workers and for workers in manufacturing; data on  lay-
3off  requests  at  the  provincial  level  are  also  analyzed.  Section  8  quantifies  the  impact  of
minimum wage hikes on total investment and on foreign direct investment.  Section 9 concludes.
2.  The Minimum  Wage  Policy
a)  Recent Developments
In 1989, new legislation was introduced in Indonesia to regularize the haphazard system
of minimum wages that had been in force in most regions since the early  1970s.  In the new
system, minimum wages have to be set with reference to minimum physical needs, the cost of
living  and  labor  market  conditions.  The original goal  of the  government  was to  bring the
minimum  wage  in line with the cost  of a consumption  bundle known  as KFM  by  1994.  A
broader  consumption  bundle,  aimed  at  satisfying  "subsistence"  needs,  rather  than  the  bare
"physical minimum",  is now considered as the appropriate reference.  This  bundle, known  as
KHM, costs  15 to 20 percent more than the KFM.  The new goal is to bring the minimum-wage
in line with the KHM by 1998.
Since consumption  prices (hence, the cost of the  bundles) and  labor market conditions
vary across different regions of Indonesia, different provinces have different minimum  wages.
The largest provinces may even have separate minimum wages for specific districts and, in some
cases,  for  specific sectors  of activity.  Minimum  wage variance across  districts  in the  same
province is low, however.  The exception is Riau, where the free-trade-zone of Batam (an island
near Singapore) has a much higher minimum wage than the rest of the province.  Note however
that the 1994 and 1998 targets of the minimum wage policy refer to the cost of the consumption
bundles only, and the variation in this cost across provinces is quite  low.  Much lower, in any
event, than the variation in average labor earnings or productivity across provinces.
4Local labor market conditions influence the speed at which minimum wages converge to
their long-run targets.  These conditions are assessed by formally tri-partite councils operating at
the  provincial  level.  Most  of the  council  members are  from the  provincial  antenna  of  the
Ministry  of Manpower, which also appoints the delegates from employers and employees.  In
some  cases,  an  informal  survey  of  companies  operating  in the  province  may  precede  any
decision.  The council makes a minimum wage recommendation to the provincial governor, who
may  revise  it to  bring  it in  line with  the  long-run  target  of the  government.  The  revised
recommendation is sent to the Ministry of Manpower in Jakarta, which has the final word.
The increase  in the average  minimum  wage under the  new  labor market  policy  was
three-fold  in nominal terms, and two-fold  in real terms, as shown in Figure  1.  The minimum
wage reported in the Figure is an unweighted average across provinces, which corresponds to the
standard Indonesian practice.  However, the yearly figure used for each of the  provinces  is a
time-weighted  average of the  most representative  (often,  the  only) minimum  wage  in force,
which is a less standard practice.  For instance, if the yearly adjustment in a particular province
and a particular year took place in April, the figure for such province and year is an average of
the  old and the new minimum  wages, with weights one  fourth and  three fourths respectively.
This criterion  is used all  along the paper, and  it may explain  some differences  with  official
Indonesian  sources.  The resulting  minimum  wages figures  by  province  are  reported  in the
Appendix of the paper.
While the minimum wage hike of the first half of the 1990s is impressive, productivity
and earnings also increased remarkably during the same period.  Table  I combines data from a
variety of sources to compare the average minimum wage to a set of indicators measuring  labor
productivity and  labor costs at the aggregate level, as well as for specific sub-sets of workers.
The Table shows that the ratio of minimum wages to average wages declined between 1988 and
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Minimum Wages Versus Average Wages and Productivity
(All Indonesia Averages)
Minimum  wages as a fraction of  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994
Average productivity  per worker
Total output  0.199  0.175  0.177  0.200  0.215  0.198  0.217
Output excluding  oil and gas  0.235  0.206  0.209  0.234  0.249  0.220  0.239
Value added in large manufacturing  0.062  0.051  0.051  0.061  0.057
Value added in small manufacturing  0.256  0.355
Labor costs per worker, by sector
Wages  of urban laborers & employees  0.349  0.333  0.319  0.379  0.398  0.380  0.424
Wages in manufacturing  0.352  0.337  0.372  0.440
Labor costs in large manufacturing  0.278  0.253  0.255  0.275  0.254
Labor costs in small manufacturing  0.761  0.931
Labor costs per worker, by gender
Wages of male urban laborers & employees  0.312  0.285  0.281  0.332  0.349  0.335  0.375
Wages of female  urban laborers & employees  0.495  0.448  0.462  0.539  0.562  0.526  0.579
Wages of male workers in manufacturing  0.321  0.309  0.343  0.410
Wages of female workers in manufacturing  0.474  0.449  0.488  0.567
Note:  All figures are calculated based on Indonesian averages.  The data sources are national accounts (for rows 1 and 2), the labor force survey
(rows  1, 2, 5, 9 and 10), the wage survey (for rows 6,  11 and  12), the survey of large manufacturing establishments (rows  3 and 7) and
the survey of small scale manufacturing industries (rows 4 and 8).1990, or even 1991,  and then increased  by about one third. If data for 1995 were available, the
increase  could be as much  as one half. Such an increase  is much smaller  than the one depicted in
Figure 1, but it is still unusually  high by international  standards. Note, however,  that the ratio of
minimum to average wages attained in 1995 may start declining gradually, given the policy
target set for 1998  and the outstanding  pace of productivity  growth.
b)  Are Minimum  Wages  Endogenous?
The role played by  local councils in  making recommendations  to the Ministry of
Manpower suggests that the level of minimum wages may be endogenous, in the sense of
depending on the  ability of firms to  afford them.  Endogeneity, in  turn, has  important
implications.  From a  normative perspective, there would be less reason to  worry about
minimum  wages. A higher minimum  wage level would reflect  an improvement  in labor market
conditions,  rather than represent  a threat to employment.  Conversely,  a down-swing  in economic
activity could be expected  to lead, more or less automatically,  to a decline in the real level of
minimum wages. From a positive  perspective,  endogeneity  implies that the standard estimates
of the impact of minimum  wages on other variables, such as wage earnings or employment,
could be biased. The minimum  wage hikes would represent  "unnatural"  experiments,  making it
necessary  to control  for the forces that led  to the these  hikes to obtain  unbiased  estimates.
Some evidence  that minimum  wage hikes are affected by local labor market conditions
is presented  in Table 2.  The two sets of regressions  in this Table link the annual change in the
provincial minimum  wage to the contemporary  and lagged changes in the provincial average
wage, and to the contemporary  and lagged levels of the provincial employment-to-population
ratio, respectively.  The coefficients on the lagged variables are positive and statistically
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Minimum Wage Hikes and Local Labor Market Conditions
Dependent  variable:
change in the log of the minimum  wage
Explanatory  variables  (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)  (F)
Independent  0.1473  0.1146  0.0671
term  (8.140)  (4.497)  (2.489)
Change in the log of average  0.0987  0.1879  0.2472
earnings of laborers & employees  (0.912)  (1.574)  (2.112)
Same variable,  0.1994  0.3008
lagged one year  (1.690)  (2.573)
Same variable,  0.3674
lagged two years  (3.617)
Independent  0.1550  0.1487  0.1487
term  (13.884)  (12.893)  (11.946)
Change  in the log of the urban  0.2890  0.4409  0.4355
employment/population  ratio  (1.912)  (2.668)  (2.554)
Same variable,  0.3567  0.3724
lagged one year  (2.243)  (2.021)
Same variable,  0.0455
lagged two years  (0.290)
Adjusted  R 2 - 0.001  0.014  0.097  0.017  0.040  0.031
F test  0.832  2.081  6.613  3.654  4.299  2.653
Number  of observations  159  158  157  159  158  157
Note:  There  is one observation per province per year,  as allowed by the data.  Values in parentheses are "t" statistics.significant in most of the regressions, which can be interpreted as evidence that minimum wages
increase at a faster pace in provinces with tighter labor markets.
There are several reasons,  however, to think that  the minimum  wage hikes of recent
years were mostly "exogenous".  First among these reasons is the nature of the political process
that  led  to  the  new  labor  market  policy.  It  would  be  difficult  to  find  a  more  extraneous
determinant of minimum wage increases than pressure from foreign governments and agencies.
Clearly, influence activities by consumers and trade unions in the US were largely independent
from the tightness of the labor market in Indonesia.  Furthermore, the main domestic mechanism
underlying minimum wage hikes was exogenous too.  The targets set by the government, namely
bringing minimum wages in line with the KFM consumption bundle by 1994, and with the KHM
bundle by 1998, are indeed independent from local labor market conditions.
Additional support  to  the exogeneity  hypothesis is provided  by the  data themselves.
First, the coefficient of determination of the regressions reported in Table 2 is low.  If minimum
wages were endogenous, local labor market conditions would account for a  large share of the
variation  in  minimum  wage  hikes  across  provinces  and  years.  But  the  coefficients  of
determination  in Table 2 are often  close to zero, and never exceed 0.1.  Second, the range of
variation  of the ratios  between  minimum wages and  average wages  or average productivity,
shown in Table 3, is wide.  If  ability to pay mattered, the variance of these ratios would not be
much higher than the one observed over time, for all of Indonesia, in Table  1.  But instead of
disparities in the range of one third to one half between the highest and the lowest ratios, Table 3
displays maxima which are five to seventy times bigger than the corresponding minima.
The exogeneity of minimum wage hikes, and the wide dispersion observed in the ratios
of minimum  wages to average productivity and  labor costs, greatly facilitate the estimation  of
the impact of minimum wages.  Of course, part of the dispersion reported  in Table  3 may be
7Table  3
Minimum Wage Variance Across Provinces
(in 1988-95)
Minimum  wage as fraction of  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std. dev.  N. of obs.
Average  productivity  per worker
Total output  0.028  0.739  0.249  0.127  186
Output  excluding  oil and gas  0.062  0.739  0.269  0.115  186
Value added in large manufacturing  0.025  0.406  0.077  0.059  132
Value added in small manufacturing  0.039  2.773  0.453  0.417  46
Labor costs per worker, by sector
Wages of urban laborers & employees  0.177  0.585  0.349  0.076  186
Wages in manufacturing  0.183  0.649  0.384  0.097  102
Labor costs in large manufacturing  0.108  1.232  0.304  0.145  132
Labor costs in small manufacturing  0.229  6.618  1.407  1.219  45
Labor costs per worker, by gender
Wages of male urban laborers & employees  0.165  0.543  0.318  0.068  186
Earnings  of female  urban laborers & employees  0.208  0.789  0.469  0.115  186
Wages of male workers in manufacturing  0.183  0.770  0.354  0.090  102
Wages of female  workers in manufacturing  0.239  1.064  0.533  0.193  89
Note:  The  numbers  in  this  table are descriptive  statistics  for  the ratio between  the  minimum  wage and  either
average wages or average labor productivity,  as defined  in Table  1.either  irrelevant or fictitious.  For instance, provincial  minimum wages  may appear very  low
compared to total output per worker in some specific province, but not be so low when the output
of an enclave activity  such as oil and gas production is set aside.  Also, part of the dispersion
may be due to low quality data.  For instance, results involving value added or labor costs per
worker in small manufacturing firms must be interpreted with great caution.  But even if some of
the ratios in Table 3 were set aside, variation across provinces would still be much higher than
variation across states in the US.
c)  Applicability and Enforcement
Minimum wages would have a limited impact on  labor market outcomes if firms were
not forced to comply.  In the case of Indonesia, there are two main sources of non-compliance.
First,  firms  that  are  unable  to  afford the  minimum  wage  can  request  a  "waiver"  from  the
Ministry of Manpower.  If authorized, they can postpone for one year the implementation of the
new minimum  wage level.  But  in order to obtain the waiver,  these firms have to  open their
accounts for official scrutiny.  This requisite may actually work as a deterrent, as suggested by
the  low number of requests  submitted to the Ministry  of Manpower.  There have  never been
more than  135 of these requests per year, in a country that has about 20 thousand medium and
large firms in manufacturing, not to mention other sectors of activity.
Moreover,  requests  for  minimum  wage  waivers are  not  correlated  with  the  size  of
minimum wage increases, as shown in Figure 2.  Each square  in this- Figure corresponds to a
specific province in a particular year.  For the sake of clarity, the case of  Kalimantan Timur in
1992 is not represented  in the Figure.  In that province and  year, there  were 238 requests  for
waivers per million urban wage earners, in spite of minimum wages growing at an average rate
of "only"  20 percent per year.  Regarding the other observations, a more elaborated  analysis,
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Requests  for Minimum  Wage  Waivers
(by provinces, in 1992-95)
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inflation rate and other relevant variables, could affect somewhat the pattern depicted in Figure
2.  But the fact would remain that in most of the provinces and  years there  were no  requests
submitted at all.  It is thus safe to conclude that minimum wage waivers are not a relevant source
of non-compliance.
A second and more important reason why firms may not comply with minimum wages is
the  weakness  of  enforcement  capabilities.  In the  case  of  Indonesia, this  weakness  became
evident in 1994, when minimum wage adjustments were unusually high, and the period allowed
to implement them was surprisingly brief.  Many firms were unable or unwilling to pay higher
wages, and a series of labor conflicts (some of them wild) erupted in several provinces.  But the
visibility of these conflicts should not lead to the conclusion that strikes in Indonesia are mostly
driven by the lack of compliance with minimum wages.  Even in 1994, only  103 out of the 296
strikes  accounted  for  by the  Ministry  of Manpower  were related  in  one  way  or another  to
minimum  wages.  The proportion had been similar in  1993, and it declined in the first half of
1995, when only 9 of a total of 37 strikes were due to the  lack of compliance with minimum
wages (for a description of industrial relations in Indonesia, see Agrawal, 1995).
The weak correlation which exists between minimum wage hikes and labor conflicts is
highlighted by Figure 3.  As in the previous Figure, a couple of observations are set aside for the
sake of clarity.  These observations correspond to Yogyakarta in  1994 and  1995, when there
were  155 and  120 strikes  per  million  urban  wage earners  respectively.  In those  years,  the
provincial minimum wage was growing at an annual rate of roughly 25 percent.  But regardless
of whether these two observations are taken into account or not, no clear pattern emerges from
the  Figure.  As before,  changes in the variables considered to  explain the number  of  strikes
9Figure 3  4
Strikes and Minimum  Wage Hikes
(by provinces, in 1990-91  and 1993-95)
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by the heavy concentration of observations on the horizontal axis of the Figure.
While strikes do not appear to play a direct role in forcing firms to comply with higher
minimum wages, they  may have boosted compliance in some other, more  indirect ways.  The
extended press coverage received by  some of the wildest conflicts may have made firms more
cautious of not upsetting their workers.  Publicity is actually the main mechanism chosen by the
government to enforce minimum wages. The black-listing of the companies that do not respect
labor  rights was announced  in  1994, as a  device  "to  develop  good  moral  and  ethic  among
Indonesian  businessmen".  In order to be dropped from the  list, companies  have  to "confess
guilty and pledge to apology" (the excerpts are from an article appeared in the first page of The
Indonesia Times, on March  Ist, 1995). Economic sanctions, by contrast, are not highly relevant.
Transgressors of minimum wage laws incur a fine of approximately 50 US dollars, which  is a
low sum for large establishments.
3.  Theory  and the Available  Evidence
a)  A Partial Equilibrium Analysis
Assuming minimum  wages are enforced, how do they  affect  labor market  outcomes?
The answer crucially depends on the nature of the labor market equilibrium.  Two extreme cases
are usually considered in the literature; they are identified in what follows as the  neoclassical
case and the monopsony case.  In the neoclassical case, many firms compete for workers while a
large number of individuals compete for jobs.  As a result of this competition, none of the agents
involved (neither a firm nor an individual) can affect the equilibrium wage.  In the monopsony
10case, by contrast, individuals still compete for jobs but there  is only one firm operating  in the
local labor market.  This firm has therefore some power to make wages.
The consequences of imposing a minimum wage in each of the two cases are illustrated
in Figure 4.  The downward-sloping curve in this Figure represents the marginal productivity  of
labor.  For a given stock of the other factors of production, the contribution to output of each
additional worker is assumed to decrease as the total number of workers increases.  Since no firm
would hire a worker that costs more than he or she contributes to production, this curve can be
interpreted  as  a  labor  demand  schedule.  The upward-sloping  curve,  in turn,  represents  the
alternative earnings of the workers.  To make the presentation simple, consider the case of a firm
or a set of firms settling in a rural area. As the wages paid by the firm(s) increase, more villagers
prefer to migrate to the local town and become wage earners.  This curve therefore represents the
labor supply schedule.
In the neoclassical case, all the firms operating in the area compete to attract villagers to
their factories.  Competition drives wages up to the point where the alternative earnings of the
marginal  villager become equal to  his or her  contribution to output  in any of the competing
firms.  In terms of Figure 4, the equilibrium wage level is D and the equilibrium employment
level is L*.  What are the consequences of mandating a  minimum wage?  If the minimum  is
lower than D, it has no effect, because all workers make more than the minimum  anyway.  A
minimum wage higher than  D, in turn, would force firms to shed labor in order to  increase its
marginal productivity.  In graphical terms, firms move upwards on the labor demand curve.  For
instance, if  the minimum wage was set at level B, employment would fall from L* to L'.
In the monopsony case, by contrast, the only firm operating in the rural  area can take
advantage of the fact that a higher wage attracts more villagers to the town.  In graphical terms,
the firm chooses the point of the labor supply curve that maximizes its profits.  As long as the
11Figure  4
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Ls  LB  Employmentwage it sets is lower than D, a higher wage has two opposite effects on the firm's  profits.  On the
one  hand,  profits  increase  because  the  firm  succeeds  in  attracting  more  workers  and  these
additional  workers produce more than  they are paid (i.e. they  are "exploited").  On the  other
hand, profits decrease because the wage that has to be paid to each and everyone of the workers
increases (i.e. they are all  less "exploited").  In graphical terms, the optimal wage G, from the
point of view of the firm, is the one that maximizes the profit area ACHG.  The equilibrium
employment level is therefore lower than L*; in the example it is equal to L'.
What happens if a minimum wage is introduced in the monopsony case?  To exaggerate
matters,  consider  a  minimum  wage  that  is  set  exactly  at  level  D.  If  the  firm  keeps  its
employment  at level L',  the minimum wage makes its profits fall from ACHG to ACED.  But
now, the trade-off described in the previous paragraph does not apply anymore.  There are L*
villagers willing to work for a wage equal to D, so that the firm does not need to raise wages to
increase  its  employment.  Given  that  the  marginal  productivity  of  labor  exceeds  D  when
employment  is L',  hiring additional  workers  increases  profits.  In the  example,  profits  are
maximized  when  employment  is equal  to  L*.  More  generally,  in  the  monopsony  case,  a
minimum wage within the range of values from G to D leads to an increase in employment.
The neoclassical case and the monopsony case are not as different as it may appear at a
first glance though.  First of all, in both cases a minimum wage which  is too low to be binding
has no effects on either wages or employment; the only difference in this respect concerns what
is considered  "too  low"  in each of the  two cases (less than  D  or less than  G, respectively).
Second, in both cases an increase of a binding minimum wage leads to an increase in the wages
of those who have a job.  As a result, profits decrease, and  investment can be expected to fall.
And third, in both cases a minimum wage which is too high (in terms of the Figure, higher than
12D) leads to a decrease in employment.  The controversy thus concerns the employment  effects
over a relatively narrow range of minimum wage levels only.
In the longer run, the prospects for workers depend not only on the way firms adjust their
employment  levels for a given capital stock, but also on the way they adjust their capital stock.
In terms of Figure 4, the minimum wage hike may end  up affecting investment decisions  and,
therefore, shifting the labor demand curve.  The direction of this shift is unclear though.  On the
one  hand, higher  labor costs  could lead to  an increase  in the capital  intensity of production,
hence in investment.  On the other hand, higher labor costs could also imply lower profits, which
in turn would reduce the incentive to invest.  The two effects would be larger in the monopsony
model than in the neoclassical model, but the net outcome would remain ambiguous in both.
A majority of economists believe the neoclassical model provides more useful insights
into the workings of the labor market than the monopsony model does.  Strictly speaking, the
monopsony model applies only to one-company towns, and this  is a quite uncommon setting.
However,  some  claim  that  job  search  entails  transaction  costs  which  make  most  workers
resemble the villagers of the example.  For instance, job seekers who turn down an employment
offer  today  may  experience  several  weeks  of  unemployment  before they  get  a  new  one.
Moreover, the new offer will not necessarily be better than the current one.  Therefore, the higher
is the wage offered by the firm, the higher is the number of job seekers who will accept the offer.
Each individual firm would thus face an upward-sloping labor supply curve, in spite of the large
number of firms competing for workers.  This theoretical argument being logically consistent,
the relevance of each of the two models needs to be assessed on an empirical basis.
13b)  The International  Evidence
In reviewing  the international  evidence  on the effects of minimum  wages, it is useful to
distinguish between industrial countries, where  enforcement capabilities are  high,  and
developing  countries,  where non-compliance  is widespread. In industrial countries,  most of the
studies published until the early 1990s indicate a negative impact of minimum wages on
employment. In the US, these studies focus on teen-agers,  who represent a large share of all
minimum  wage earners because  of their lack of skills and work experience. The conventional
wisdom is that the elasticity of teen-ager  employment  with respect to the minimum  wage is in
the order of -0.1 to -0.3.  Taken literally,  this means  that if the minimum wage was doubled,
teen-ager  employment  would fall by some 10  to 30 percent  (see Brown,  Gilroy and Cohen, 1982,
Brown, 1988,  and Neumark  and Wascher,  1992).
More recent studies have challenged  the conventional  wisdom. A hotly debated piece
compared changes  in employment  in the contiguous  states of New Jersey and Pennsylvania,  at a
time when the minimum  wage increased  in the former  but not in the latter. The study  focused on
employment  in fast-food  restaurants,  which  are the typical minimum  wage employers  in the US.
Data from a telephone survey of some 400 of these restaurants indicated an  expansion of
employment  in New Jersey,  compared  to the Pennsylvania  control  group (see Card and Krueger,
1994). The authors  of the study view  this result  as evidence  in favor of the monopsony  model of
the labor  market.
Not surprisingly, the New Jersey-Pennsylvania  experiment was subject to criticism.
Particularly,  payroll records from a smaller sample of fast-food restaurants, including some of
those covered in the telephone survey, showed a decline, rather than an expansion, in New
Jersey's employment  (see Neumark  and Wascher, 1995). The elasticity of employment  to the
14minimum wage estimated based on payroll records is very much in line with the conventional
wisdom.  However,  the  debate  seems  far  from  over.  Some  of  the  studies  on  which  the
conventional wisdom  is based have also been criticized  on methodological grounds  (see Card
and Krueger, 1995).  In the same vein, a recent study for the UK concluded that the elasticity of
employment  to  minimum  wages  was  negligible,  if  not positive  (see  Dickens,  Machin  and
Manning, 1994). But on the other hand, a careful study for Canada found disemployment effects
even larger than those implied by the conventional wisdom (see Benjamin, 1995).
In the  case  of developing  countries, the  problem of getting  reliable  estimates  of the
effects of minimum wages is aggravated by low compliance with labor laws.  Even in countries
where administrative capabilities are relatively strong, such as Costa Rica, actual enforcement  is
lax.  Individual data from household surveys shows that at least one third of the workers who are
allegedly covered by minimum wage legislation in that country earn less than the legal minimum
(see Gindling and Terrell, 1995).  More disturbingly, roughly the same proportion earns less than
the minimum  wage in the  uncovered sectors of the economy.  These results  indicate that the
minimum  wage is not an effective floor, and  imply that minimum wage laws do not have the
intended effect of protecting workers with little bargaining power from being "exploited".
Only  in a few cases is it possible to find a developing country having the enforcement
capabilities  of  an  industrial  country.  Puerto  Rico,  whose  minimum  wage  institutions  are
governed  by  the  Congress  of the  US,  is one  of them.  A  well-known  study  estimated  the
elasticity  of  employment  to  the  minimum  wage  in this  country  at  approximately  -0.5  (see
Castillo-Freeman and Freeman, 1992).  The problem in interpreting this result is that a strongly
negative  elasticity could  be consistent  with both the neoclassical  and the  monopsony  model,
given the unusually high level of minimum wages in Puerto Rico.  The latter amount to almost
half of the average wage in manufacturing, compared to roughly one quarter in the US
15In more conventional  developing country settings, where enforcement  capabilities are
much  weaker, estimates  of disemployment  effects tend  to  be more  mitigated.  The  contrast
between Morocco, Mexico and Colombia is interesting in this respect.  In Morocco, agricultural
supply has been shown to increase with the rural minimum wage, which has been interpreted as
evidence of labor reallocation from small units to larger establishments with some monopsony
power (see Azam,  1994).  In Mexico, where the minimum wage was a bare  13 percent of the
average unskilled manufacturing wage by 1990, no disemployment effects could be found.  But
in Colombia, where the ratio was about 53 percent, the elasticity of unskilled employment to the
minimum wage could be close to -0.1 (see Bell, 1995).
It is thus fair to conclude that evidence exists to support either  of the two sides of the
debate  (see  World  Bank,  1995, chapter  11).  This  conclusion  should  come  as  no  surprise.
Whether minimum wages have a positive or a negative impact on employment depends on the
structure of the labor market, the level at which the minimum wage is set, and the government's
ability  to  enforce  it.  Since all  three  features  may  vary from  country  to country,  extracting
general lessons from the international evidence and applying them to the Indonesian case could
be a meaningless exercise.  Both the theoretical analysis and the international evidence provide a
useful background, but a careful assessment of the Indonesian data cannot be skipped.
c)  Previous Studies on Indonesia
There  has  been much  debate  in recent  years about what  happened to  real  wages  in
Indonesia.  A fair summary of the outcome of this debate would probably involve the following
two propositions: i) urban wages grew faster than agricultural wages, but ii) they grew less than
urban labor productivity.  The first of these propositions is documented by Manning (1994), who
shows there has been no sustained upward movement in casual agricultural wage rates in the rice
16sector, traditionally  the most important employer of labor in Indonesia. The second one is
slightly more controversial. While Nachrowi  et al. (1995) claim workers have not shared the
benefits from economic  growth, Agrawval  (1996) forcefully  argues that average wage earnings
and output  per capita  have expanded  at roughly  the same rate.
These two views are not totally incompatible  though.  Manning (1994) mentions a
couple of reasons that may account for a rapid increase in urban wage  earnings, in spite of less
buoyant  urban wage  rates.  First, Indonesian  workers  are increasingly  educated. Part of the rise
in wage earnings may thus reflect a composition  effect, particularly in a context where skilled
labor remains a scarce resource compared  to the needs of modern sector firms.  And second,
many of the new  jobs are in large establishments,  where workers  tend to earn a significant  share
of their income under the form of over-time  payments  and annual bonuses.  In this respect,  the
relevant indicator  to assess whether Indonesian  workers shared the fruits of economic growth
would neither be the basic wage rate nor total wage earnings  per worker, but rather the average
earnings  per hour, including  over-time  and bonuses.
Beyond the controversy  on the exact order of magnitude  of the gains for urban wage
earners, these gains admit two explanations. A first possibility  is that Indonesia is not a labor
surplus economy  anymore. For a very long time, rural migration  exerted a downward  pressure
on urban wages. The growth rate of the latter was thus determined  by productivity  growth in
agriculture, in spite of much higher productivity  growth in the expanding  modern sector. Now
that the fraction of agriculture in the total labor force has fallen for the first time below 50
percent, the turning point towards a labor scarce economy  may have been reached, at least in
some provinces  and sectors. In this interpretation,  the growth  of urban wages would be mostly
market driven,  and it should  accelerate  in the coming  years.
17But Indonesia may still be a labor surplus economy, in which case the increase of wage
earnings in recent years could be partly attributed to the minimum  wage policy adopted  in the
late  1980s and early  1990s.  This is the preferred explanation of Nachrowi et al. (1995),  who
claim that most firms in Jawa and Sumatera Utara paid their workers around the minimum wage
in  1980-91, in spite of limited enforcement efforts by the government.  It is also preferred by
Manning (1994), who conjectures that at least part of the increase in real wages observed  in the
textile sector in the early  1990s might be attributed to government attention to minimum wages,
especially in the textile sector.
A few studies have tried to assess the consequences of the recent minimum wage hikes
in a more systematic way.  One of them, by an author who has preferred to remain anonymous,
includes a survey of seven managers in the footwear industry, four in garments and an official
from a footwear textile association.  All of the interviewees were quite  clear that the factories
they owned or dealt with paid the minimum wage or more, although they acknowledged most
female  workers  earned the minimum  only.  Minimum  wage hikes were not the  number  one
concern of these factories though.  More important problems were low labor productivity, trade
barriers, difficulties getting licenses and permits, and general red-tape and bureaucratic delays.
A second study,  by the Ministry of Manpower itself (Depnaker,  1995), diagnosed the
textile industry in the districts of Majalaya and Pekalongan after various mass media reported it
was under a threat of bankruptcy.  The study covers the period 1993-95, based on a sample of 15
small and medium-size firms.  All of the firms surveyed in Pekalongan were complying with the
legal minimum wages, and had not varied their number of workers during the three-year  period
considered.  The increase in minimum wages was not mentioned as a major source of concern by
their managers,  although it had  led to an unambiguous decline  in profits.  In this  respect, the
18study mentions that managers in Pekalongan usually view their employees as their own relatives,
and providing work as a religious obligation.
In Majalaya, by contrast, employment declined over the period 1993-95. Two out of the
six companies  surveyed in that district  suppressed one  shift, and  one of them  laid off almost
three quarters of its personnel.  The study claims this employment decline was due to the scarcity
of raw  materials,  which  led to  a  substantial cost  increase.  Three  of the  firms  surveyed  in
Majalaya report the average monthly earnings of their workers, and these are clearly above the
minimum wage indeed.  However, no information on labor earnings is provided by the two firms
that reduced  their personnel.  It  is therefore  unclear whether these two firms were hit  by the
minimum wage hike.
Finally, a 1995 survey of women workers in selected sectors included a few questions on
compliance  with the minimum  wage (Pangestu, 1996).  Overall,  78 percent of the respondents
received base wages in line with the minimum legal requirement.  The share was as high as 88
percent if food and transportation allowances are taken into account as well.  However, the level
of compliance  varied much across plant  sizes and sectors of activity.  Only 30 percent of the
workers in small firms, and 37 percent of those in medium-sized firms, were actually  paid the
legal minimum.  Among the sectors surveyed, the lowest level of compliance (51 percent of the
interviewees) was found in the shoe industry, and the highest in the textile industry.
4.  Minimum  Wages  and the Wage Distribution
a)  The Extent of Compliance
Individual  data  on  the  earnings  of  laborers and  employees  can  be used  to  evaluate
whether  minimum  wages  are binding.  These data provide  information  on  how  many  wage
19earners  make less than the corresponding  minimum,  in spite  of working  full time. The lower the
percentage of workers who earn less than the minimum,  the higher the extent of compliance.
These data also show whether or not the earnings of full time workers are concentrated at or
around  the legal minimum,  i.e. whether  the earnings  distribution  displays  a discontinuity. Such a
clustering  of individual  earnings  would indicate  an effective  enforcement  of minimum  wages. In
the absence  of it, a small percentage  of workers  earning  less than the legal minimum  wage would
only mean than the latter  is set a relatively  low level,  not that it is binding.
The analysis of individual  earnings  data in this section is based on the 1993 labor force
survey (Sakernas). Using data from 1993  is potentially  illuminating  for several reasons. First,
minimum wages were already high at that time.  The ratio of minimum wages to output per
worker  excluding  gas and oil was  26 percent in 1993,  compared  to 21 percent  three years earlier.
Second, 1993  was probably  a relatively  "normal"  year in terms of compliance. Particularly,  the
minimum  wage increases  of 1993 were not as sharp and .unexpected  as those of 1994.  As a
result, it may have  been relatively  easier for firms to adjust  to the new situation.
The analysis focuses  on laborers  and employees  aged 10 years or more who worked at
least 35 hours in their main occupation  during the week preceding the survey.  The daily
earnings  of these workers  are calculated  based on their wages or salaries and hours of work in
their main occupation. Consistency  across responses  is used to set aside "noisy" observations,
thus leading to a sample of roughly 6,000 observations  per quarter.  Workers are classified
according  to their residence  (urban  or rural)  and sector  of activity.  Given the limited  relevance  of
minimum  wages in rural areas, some of the results presented below correspond  to urban wage
earnings only.  Earnings in manufacturing  correspond  to both urban and rural areas though,
because  the aggregate  data to be used in the econometric  analysis  of sections  5 to 7 includes  all
establishments,  regardless  of their area of location.
20The  fraction of full-time  laborers and  employees  with  earnings below  the  minimum
wage in 1993 is reported in Table 4.  The figures indicate an uneven extent of compliance across
regions.  Overall, roughly 15 percent of all urban laborers and employees, and a similar fraction
of the laborers and employees in manufacturing, earn less than the minimum.  But the fraction is
close to zero in some provinces, and as high as 40 percent in others.  A similar variance can be
observed in the case of female workers, and of workers aged  15 to 24.  Figures for any of these
two groups in some specific provinces should be interpreted with caution, due to the small size
of the corresponding samples.  But on average, it is clear that compliance is lower in the case of
young workers, and much lower in the case of female workers.
b)  Do Minimum Wages Bite?
The shape of the wage distribution can be used to evaluate whether minimum wages are
actually  enforced.  In the  absence  of government  intervention, the  wage  distribution  can  be
expected  to  be  relatively  smooth,  reflecting  the  underlying distribution  of  skills  and  other
individual characteristics.  However, if some of those  who  would have  earned  less than  the
minimum  lose their job, while other get a pay increase, a discontinuity should appear.  Visual
inspection of the wage distribution usually allows  identifying this  sort of discontinuity.  It is
applied here to density functions drawn at the province level for each of the groups of workers
considered  in Table 4.  Note that the drawing of the density  functions already  involves some
"smoothing"  of the data, so that visual inspection tends to under-estimate the effectiveness  of
enforcement.
Based on this exercise, it is safe to conclude that minimum wages do affect the shape of
the wage distribution in many Indonesian provinces.  In most cases, the steeper upward-sloping
section of the density function corresponds to earnings at or around the minimum wage level.
21Table 4
Compliance  with the Minimum Wage by Provinces
(in 1993)
Fraction  of full-time  workers  earning less than the minimum  wage
Urban  laborers & employees  Manufacturing  laborers & employees
Province  All  Female  Age 15-24  All  Female  Age 15-24
D.I. Aceh  0.064  0.124  0.234  0.072  0.174  0.080
Sumatera  Utara  0.173  0.430  0.371  0.192  0.448  0.326
Sumatera  Barat  0.060  0.114  0.148  0.163  0.399  0.228
Riau  0.048  0.202  0.176  0.074  0.221  0.139
Jambi  0.099  0.298  0.290  0.065  0.306  0.096
Bengkulu  0.131  0.359  0.298  0.172  0.552  0.298
Sumatera  Selatan  0.076  0.143  0.230  0.124  0.000  0.199
Lampung  0.188  0.419  0.449  0.413  0.522  0.670
D.K.I. Jakarta  0.134  0.333  0.314  0.055  0.119  0.131
Jawa Barat  0.108  0.242  0.181  0.115  0.182  0.137
Jawa Tengah  0.218  0.468  0.379  0.212  0.380  0.287
Yogyakarta  0.010  0.239  0.172  0.121  0.276  0.187
Jawa Timur  0.212  0.415  0.375  0.182  0.314  0.250
Bali  0.198  0.380  0.378  0.394  0.646  0.492
Nusa Tenggara  Barat  0.146  0.363  0.322  0.172  0.323  0.132
Nusa Tenggara  Timur  0.178  0.315  0.595  0.444  1.000  1.000
Timor Timur  0.155  0.364  0.483  0.000  0.000  0.000
Kalimantan  Barat  0.092  0.200  0.281  0.110  0.252  0.235
Kalimantan  Tengah  0.060  0.100  0.197  0.033  0.235  0.095
Kalimantan  Selatan  0.066  0.160  0.134  0.062  0.179  0.014
Kalimantan  Timur  0.023  0.090  0.040  0.000  0.000  0.000
Sulawesi  Utara  0.104  0.239  0.260  0.295  0.722  0.361
Sulawesi  Tengah  0.136  0.263  0.460  0.141  0.000  0.000
Sulawesi  Selatan  0.064  0.182  0.161  0.194  0.336  0.284
Sulawesi  Tenggara  0.032  0.048  0.109  0.000  0.000  0.000
Maluku  0.068  0.221  0.313  0.015  0.078  0.078
Irian Jaya  0.111  0.235  0.309  0.259  0.669  0.199
All  Indonesia  0.148  0.339  0.290  0.147  0.269  0.206
Note: The data are from the labor force survey.  Note that the sample has less than ten observations for
some  groups  of  workers  in  D.I.  Aceh,  Sumatera  Selatan,  Nusa  Tenggara  Timur,  Timor  Timur,
Kalimantan Tengah,  Sulawesi Tengah, Sulawesi Tenggara, Maluku and Irian Jaya.Quite often, this  section is almost vertical,  as shown in Figures 5 and  6, which correspond  to
urban  wage earners  in  Jawa  Barat  and  to  workers  in  manufacturing  in  Kalimantan  Tengah
respectively.  While these  two  cases could be deemed extreme, the  pattern  displayed  in the
Figures can be found in other provinces too, even for young and female workers.
There are of course some cases in which no discontinuity nor clustering of observations
can be observed.  Figure 7, which corresponds to urban wage earners  in Bengkulu,  is one of
them.  Also, for  some provinces  and  sub-sets of workers the  number  of observations  in the
sample is too small to make any inference.  However, it must be noted that for minimum wages
to be relevant it is not necessary that all of the provincial wage distributions get distorted.  The
fact that  at  least some of them  do  is enough to indicate  a  potential impact  on  earnings  and
employment.  The impact is probably larger nowadays, due to the publicity campaign undertaken
since  1994 to make enforcement more effective.
5.  Exploiting  Cross-Province  Variation  in the Data
In practice, the effects of a minimum wage hike may be more blurred than in theory.  To
illustrate the point, consider what happens to average wages.  Workers who used to make  less
than  the  new minimum  may  see their  earnings adjusted up to  the  new level.  Workers  who
initially  made more than  the  new minimum may  also  get a pay  increase,  if the  structure  of
relative wages within firms tends to be preserved.  These upward adjustments of wages, in turn,
can affect employment.  Some of the workers may lose their jobs (as in the neoclassical model)
whereas other individuals may be willing to work at the new wage rates (as  in the monopsony
model).  Employment can also be affected if some firms react to the minimum wage hike by not
complying anymore.  All of these changes in employment have an impact on average wages too.
22Figure 5
Wage Distribution for Jawa Barat
(All Urban Laborers and Employees,  1993)
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Wage Distribution for Kalimantan Tengah
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9A1LT  WAagWhile disentangling the relative importance of each of the mechanisms at work may be
an impossible task, estimating the overall impact of minimum wage hikes on average wages  is
still feasible.  The variation of average and minimum wage increases across provinces can be
used for this purpose.  The implicit assumption in this respect is that average wages would grow
at the same rate in all provinces in any specific year, if it was not by the effects of minimum
wages growing at varying paces.  Note that this assumption is not incompatible with differences
in the levels  of average wages and employment across provinces, even  in the absence  of any
minimum wage.  It is not incompatible with differences in the growth rates of average wages and
employment across years either.
In econometric parlance, all  of the estimates hereafter are based  on the application  of
fixed  effects  models  to  aggregate  data  from  the  27  provinces  over  several  years.  The
specifications used boil down to some version of the following equation:
Zit = f(MWjt) + 02  + C,  + £it
where Z 1t is an economic outcome (say, the average wage) in province i and year t, MW 2 t is the
minimum wage in force in the same province and year, 0i  is a province-specific effect, xt is a
year-specific  effect, and  Fjt  is a  stochastic disturbance.  The f(.)  function  involves no  other
aggregate variables than the minimum wage, to minimize estimation bias.  Indeed, most of the
variables that potentially affect labor market outcomes, such as economic activity, may in turn be
affected by the minimum wage.  In the "minimalist" approach adopted here, by contrast, all of
the determinants  of the outcome Zit, except for the minimum wage,  are assumed to  be either
province-specific  (e.g.  infrastructure,  natural  resources, demography...)  or time-specific  (e.g.
macroeconomic policies, external shocks, the investment climate...).
23Most of the rest of the paper is devoted to estimating the elasticity of function f(.) with
respect to variable MW for a series of economic outcomes Z.  For the sake of clarity, the main
findings are summarized in the last two rows of all subsequent Tables.  The first of these rows
calculates  the  elasticity  of  function  f(.) with  respect  to  variable  MW,  taking  the  estimated
regression coefficients at  face value regardless of their individual statistical significance.  Only
when the model itself fails to pass the F-test at the 5 percent confidence level are the estimated
coefficients treated  as zeros.  The second row,  in turn, treats  all  non significant  estimates  as
zeros, even if the model is not rejected.
The appropriate test to evaluate the statistical significance of the individual coefficients
is guided by theory.  When the predicted elasticity of function f(.) with respect to variable MW
has the same sign in both the neoclassical model and the monopsony model, a one-tail t-test  is
applied to the relevant coefficients.  Such is the case for average wages, because neither model
predicts their decline as a result of an increase in minimum wages.  A two-tail test is used, by
contrast, when the two models  lead to predictions which are either opposite (as in the case  of
employment)  or of an ambiguous  sign (as  in the case  of  investment).  The  chosen  level of
significance for the t-test is 10 percent.
6.  The Impact  on Wages
a)  Urban Wage Earnings
To analyze the impact of minimum wages on average wages, a particular version of the
basic equation is used.  The variable capturing the labor market outcome in this case is Zat  = Log
Wit, where  Wit is the average  wage in province  i and  year  t.  The underlying  "minimalist"
24function is assumed  to be of the form f(.) = ao  +  a1t + a2MWit. Replacing  in the basic equation,
and taking differences,  the following  expression  obtains:
ALog Wit  = al + a2ALog  MW 1 t + -r 1' + cit'
where Ax = x, - xt.1,  ;T'  =  AT, and  eit' = Acit. This equation is similar to the one used by Card
and Krueger  (1995,  chapter 9) for the US, except  that in the above  specification  the coefficient  a2
directly measures the elasticity of the average wage to the minimum wage.  Note that the
equation  being in differences,  the province-specific  effects  cancel  out.
Indonesian  labor force surveys  provide  valuable information  on average wage earnings.
Table 5 reports estimates of the above function when the earnings of urban laborers and
employees  (both total and by gender)  are used to measure  the dependent  variable. The earnings
data are from official publications,  so that they include part-time  workers,  and not only full-time
workers,  as was the case for the 1993  earnings  data analyzed  in the previous section. However,
the published data still allow to distinguish  between urban and rural laborers and employees.
Given the lack of enforcement  of minimum  wages in agriculture,  the econometric  work focuses
on urban laborers  and employees  only.
All  six specifications in Table 5  include two dummy variables to  account for the
uncommon patterns observed in the provinces of Riau and Timor Timur.  Labor market
outcomes  in the former  province  may have been  affected  by the expansion  of the free-trade  zone
of Batam,  while the conflict over sovereignty  in the latter  province  may have led to idiosyncratic
policies. The coefficients  multiplying  these dummy  variables  are statistically  significant  in most
specifications. By contrast,  the time-specific  effects are weak on an individual  basis; hence the
F-test performed  to assess their  joint significance.  Based on the results of this test, the preferred
specifications  are (A) for wage earners of both sexes, (C) for male wage earners and (F) for
25Table 5
Impact on Average Wage Earnings
Dependent  variable: change  in the log of
nominal earnings of urban laborers & employees
Both sexes  Males  Females
Explanatory  variables  (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)  (F)
Change in the log of  0.0888  0.0660  0.0920  0.0659  0.0602  0.1084
the minimum  wage  (1.423)  (1.190)  (1.317)  (1.076)  (0.790)  (1.657)
Independent  0.0987  0.1123  0.1005  0.1118  0.0938  0.1112
term  (5.718)  (9.371)  (5.187)  (8.447)  (4.448)  (7.871)
Dummy variable  0.0549  0.0529  0.0668  0.0646  - 0.0144  - 0.0103
for Riau  (1.488)  (1.331)  (1.613)  (1.469)  (- 0.320)  (- 0.220)
Dummy  variable  0.1000  0.1184  0.0867  0.1035  0.1525  0.1750
for Timor Timur  (1.927)  (2.137)  (1.490)  (1.690)  (2.406)  (2.680)
Year dummies  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No
Adjusted  R 2 0.166  0.025  0.133  0.016  0.120  0.041
F test for the regression  4.925  2.336  4.027  1.839  3.695  3.226
F test for year dummies  6.243  5.191  3.802
Number  of observations  159  159  159  159  159  159
Elasticity  (point estimate)  0.089  Model  0.092  Model  0.060  0.108
Elasticity  (significant  only)  0.089  rejected  0.092  rejected  0.000  0.108
Note:  There  is one observation per  province per year,  as allowed by the data.  Earnings data are  from the labor force survey.  Values
in parentheses are "t" statistics.  Statistical significance is assessed at the 5 percent for the F-test and  at the 10 percent level for
the one-tail t-test.female wage earners.  In all of these specifications, the elasticity of average wages with respect
to minimum wages is in the order of 0.1.
To check  whether the  methodological approach adopted  in  the  paper  affects  in any
crucial  way  the  estimated  elasticities,  less  "minimalist"  versions  of  the  f(.)  function  were
considered.  The regressions in Table 6 are based on equation (F) in the previous Table, but they
also add other "determinants" of  the growth of average wages, including changes in population
of working age,  changes  in average productivity (measured  in various ways) and  changes  in
consumer prices.  All of these variables are defined at the provincial level.  The interpretation of
the associated coefficients is hazardous, because the f(.) function could be the reduced form of
several, different structural models.  But the elasticity of the average female wage with respect to
the minimum wage remains very similar to the "minimalist" estimate.
b)  Wages in Manufacturing
There are three sources of information on wages and labor costs in manufacturing at the
provincial level.  One of them is the national wages survey (Survei Upah), which collects data on
the  occupation  and earnings of workers  in several thousand  establishments  with  20  or more
employees,  mainly  in  manufacturing.  The  other  two  sources  are  plant  level  surveys  of
manufacturing  firms  which  cover  respectively  medium  and  large  establishments  (Survei
Tahunan Perushaan Industri Besar dan Sedang), and small establishments and cottage industries
(Statistik Industri Kecil).  While none of these last two sources reports data on actual wages, they
both have information on the total wage bill and the number of wage earners, thus allowing the
calculation of average labor costs per worker.
The three  sources mentioned are available over a shorter period of time than  the labor
force  survey.  The last published  issue of the wage survey corresponds to  1991, and the  last
26Table 6
Robustness  of Estimates to Changes in Control Variables
Dependent  variable:  change  in the log of
nominal  eamings of female  urban laborers & employees
Explanatory  variables  (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)
Change  in the log of  0.1122  0.1176  0.1020  0.1024  0.0989
the minimum  wage  (1.693)  (1.730)  (1.567)  (1.524)  (1.469)
Independent  0.1131  0.1525  0.0686  0.1841  0.1546
term  (7.569)  (6.124)  (2.411)  (6.149)  (3.772)
Dummy  variable  - 0.0101  - 0.0528  - 0.0132  - 0.0293  - 0.0297
for Riau  (- 0.215)  (- 1.048)  (- 0.282)  (- 0.588)  (- 0.595)
Dummy  variable  0.1747  0.1488  0.1787  0.1628  0.1632
for Timor  Timur  (2.667)  (1.885)  (2.752)  (2.072)  (2.078)
Change in the log of urban  - 0.0328  -0.0139  -0.0208
population  aged 10 and above  (- 0.402)  (- 0.174)  (- 0.260)
Change  in the log of nominal  - 0.3417
output per worker, excluding  oil  (-  1.860)
Change in the log of output  - 0.9024  - 0.8583
measured  at constant  prices  (-2.605)  (- 2.460)
Change in the log of consumer  0.5762  0.3565
prices in the provincial  capital  (1.722)  (1.052)
Adjusted  R2 0.035  0.037  0.053  0.055  0.056
F test  2.447  2.253  3.191  2.521  2.287
Number of observations  159  132  159  132  132
Elasticity  (point estimate)  0.112  Model  0.102  0.102  0.099
Elasticity  (significant  only)  0.112  rejected  0.102  0.102  0.099
Note:  There  is one observation per province per year,  as allowed by the data.  Values  in parentheses
are  "t" statistics.  Statistical significance is assessed at the 5 percent level for the F-test,  and at
the  10 percent level for the one-tail t-test.published  issue of the survey of large establishments in manufacturing to  1992.  Coverage  is
even more restricted in the case of the survey of small establishments, which was carried out in
1991 and 1993 only.  Consequently, none of these three sources can account for developments in
recent  years,  when minimum  wages increased at a  faster pace, and enforcement  efforts  were
more consequent.  It is important to keep in mind, however, that variation across provinces  is
much higher in Indonesia than variation over time.  Therefore, some insight may still be gained
from analyzing data from these three sources.
Estimates based on the national wages survey are reported in Table 7 for workers of both
sexes,  for males and for females respectively.  Since neither the time-specific  effects nor  the
dummy variables for Riau and Timor Timur were statistically significant, they were all excluded
from the regressions.  Note that equation (B) has no explanatory power, which would make sense
if most of  the male workers in manufacturing had earnings above the legal minimum in the late
1980s and  early  1990s.  Note  also  that equations (A) and  (C)  yield  values of a2 which  are
statistically  significant, and  very much  in accordance with the results  reported  in Table  5 for
urban laborers and employees as a whole.
The analysis was replicated with data from the two plant level surveys.  The most salient
result  was  the  lack  of  explanatory  power  of the  model  in  any  of  the  specifications.  Two
hypotheses can be offered to explain the rejection of the model.  One of them concerns the poor
quality  of the data, and  it almost surely applies to small  firms.  Indeed, the  survey of  small
establishment reports a dramatic decline of the average labor cost per worker (in nominal terms)
in several provinces between 1991 and 1993, which is very unlikely.  The other hypothesis refers
to  compensating  changes  in wages,  and  it could  have  some  relevance  in the  case  of  large
manufacturing firms.  If labor costs include wages and allowances, a mandated increase in wages
27Table 7
Impact on Average Wages in Manufacturing
Dependent variable: change in the log
of nominal wages in manufacturing
Explanatory variables  Both sexes  Males  Females
Change in the log of  0.1065  0.0602  0.1418
the minimum wage  (2.103)  (0.927)  (1.741)
Independent  0.0474  0.0476  0.05 17
term  (4.418)  (3.615)  (3.101)
Adjusted RI  0.039  - 0.002  0.030
F test  4.053  0.860  3.033
Number of observations  76  76  66
Elasticity (point estimate)  0.107  Model  Model
Elasticity (significant only)  0.107  rejected  rejected
Note:  There is one observation per province and per year,  as allowed by the data.
Values in parentheses are "t" statistics.  Statistical significance is assessed at
the 5 percent level for the F-test and at the  10 percent level for the one-tail
t-test.  The year  dummies and the  dummy  variables  for  Riau  and  Timor
Timur were excluded from the specifications in this table because they were
not significant.can be offset, at least in principle, by a similar reduction in allowances.  This hypothesis should
not be pushed too far though, in light of the strictly positive elasticities reported in Table 7.
7.  The Impact  on Employment
a)  Urban Wage Employment
A particular version of the basic equation presented above can be used to analyze the
impact of minimum wages on employment.  Unlike the previous version of the equation, used to
analyze the impact on average wages, this one  is specified  in levels rather than  in differences.
Let the relevant labor market outcome be the ratio of employment to population, i.e. Zit = Li/Nit.
A  minimalist  version  of the  f(.)  function would  be f(.)  =  b 1 + b2(MWjt/Rjt), where  R  is an
indicator of labor productivity.  The equation to be estimated is therefore:
Li,/Nit  = b 1 + b2(MWi,fRit)  + es+  Ct+- eit
This equation is almost identical to the one used by Neumark and Wascher (1992) in the case of
the US.  Although coefficient  b2 in this  equation does not  directly measure the  elasticity  of
employment  with  respect to the  minimum  wage,  such elasticity  can  be calculated  as  b21/X,
where  l. is the sample mean of MWit/R 1t and X  the sample mean of Li,/Ni,.
In what follows, five different indicators of labor productivity are used.  Some of them
are closer to the marginal productivity of labor, while others reflect average productivity.  The
main interest of relying on a variety of indicators is to check the robustness of the results.  For
instance,  the estimated  coefficient  b2 could be significantly  negative when  using  one  of the
indicators of labor productivity, but significantly positive when using some other indicator.  In
28this case, no reliable  inference could be drawn from the regressions.  Conversely, the estimated
coefficient  b2 could be statistically insignificant for any of the productivity  indicators, but have
the  same  sign for  all  of them.  This  consistency of  results  could  be seen  as  evidence  that
minimum wages do affect employment.
The  marginal productivity  of  labor is measured through either  wages  or  labor costs,
defined  as in the previous section.  The wage variables considered are the average earnings of
urban laborers and employees of both sexes (from the labor force survey) and the average wages
of workers of both  sexes in manufacturing (from the wage  survey).  The labor cost  variable
considered  is the  average  labor cost  per  worker in large  manufacturing  firms.  The average
productivity of labor, in turn, is measured by value added per worker in either manufacturing or
all sectors excluding the production of oil and gas.  Data for value added and employment  in
manufacturing are from the survey of large firms.  Data for value added in all sectors are from
national accounts, while total employment numbers are from the labor force survey.
Regression  results  for  the  ratio  of urban  wage  employment  to  urban  population  of
working age are reported in Table  8.  The estimated elasticity  of employment with  respect to
minimum wages is statistically significant in only one of the specifications, but it has the same
sign (negative)  in fouir of them  and  is close to zero  in the  fifth one.  So, if anything,  higher
minimum wages reduce wage employment in Indonesia, as the neoclassical model would predict.
It is more difficult to decide what the order of magnitude of this effect is. The average elasticity
is - 0.025 or - 0.014 depending on whether the estimated coefficients are taken at face value or
treated as zeros when they lack statistical significance.
The  analysis  is  replicated  in  Table  9  for  young  urban  wage  employment,  with  the
population variable defined accordingly.  As in industrial countries, the jobs  of those who have
lower  skills  and  less  experience  are  more  likely to  be  at  stake  when  the  minimum  wage
29Table  8
Impact on Urban Wage Employment
Dependent  variable: urban laborers & employees  aged 10 and above/
urban population  aged 10 and above
Explanatory  variables  (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)
Mininum  wage/average  earnings  - 0.0204
of urban laborers & employees  (- 0.861)
Minimum  wagc/average  0.0057
wage in manufacturing  (0.157)
Minimum  wage/labor  costs per  - 0.0151
worker in large manufacturing  (- 0.846)
Minimum  wage/value  added per  - 0.0215
worker in large manufacturing  (- 0.530)
Minimum  wage/GDP  per worker  - 0.0553
excluding  oil and gas  (- 1.865)
Province  dumnies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Adjusted  R 2 0.832  0.842  0.826  0.825  0.835
F test  28.74  19.63  21.03  20.93  29.34
Number of observations  186  102  132  132  186
Elasticity  (point estimate)  - 0.033  0.010  - 0.022  - 0.008  - 0.070
Elasticity  (significant  only)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  - 0.070
Note:  There  is one observation per province  and  per  year,  as allowed by  the data.  Values in parentheses are  "t"
statistics.  Statistical significance is assessed at the 5 percent level for the F-test and at the 10 percent level for
the two-tail t-test.  All specifications include an independent term.Table 9
Impact on Urban Wage Employment  of Ages 15 to 24
Dependent  variable:  urban laborers & employees  aged 15 to 24/
urban population  aged 15 to 24
Explanatory  variables  (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)
Mininum  wage/average  earnings  0.0259
of urban laborers & employees  (0.876)
Minimum  wage/average  - 0.0794
wage in manufacturing  (-1.581)
Minimum  wage/labor  costs per  - 0.0038
worker in large manufacturing  (- 0.156)
Minimum  wage/value  added per  - 0.0174
worker in large manufacturing  (- 0.313)
Minimum wage/GDP  per worker  0.0447
excluding  oil and gas  (- 1.203)
Province  dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Adjusted  R 2 0.896  0.882  0.870  0.870  0.897
F test  49.35  26.95  29.20  29.23  49.59
Number  of observations  186  102  132  132  186
Elasticity  (point estimate)  0.062  - 0.228  - 0.008  - 0.010  - 0.082
Elasticity  (significant  only)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
Note:  There  is one observation per  province and per  year,  as allowed  by the data.  Values in parentheses are  "t"
statistics.  Statistical significance is assessed at the 5 percent level for the F-test and at the 10-percent level for
the two-tail t-test.  All specifications include an independent termn.increases.  The analysis  of  individual  data  from the  1993 labor  force  survey,  in section  5,
confirmed that workers in this age group get lower wages than the average Indonesian worker.
However, the disemployment  effect of the minimum wage does not appear to be stronger  for
them than for the average Indonesian worker.  Again, the estimated elasticity is negative in four
of the regressions, but it is not statistically significant in any of them.  The average elasticity is -
0.053 or zero, depending on how non significant estimates are treated.
b)  Employment in Manufacturing
The effects of the minimum wage on employment  in manufacturing vary dramatically
depending  on  the  size  of  the  establishments.  The  results  in  Table  10  suggest  that  large
manufacturing firms fit the monopsony model of the labor market.  While none of the estimated
b2 coefficients  is statistically  significant,  they  are  all  five  positive.  The average  elasticity
implied by the estimated coefficients is about 0.075, it these coefficients are taken at face value.
It is nil, however, if non statistically significant coefficients are treated as zeros.
It should be noted that one of the estimated b2 coefficients, in specification (C), may be
biased upwards though.  To make the point clear, assume employment in large manufacturing is
over-estimated  by the survey for  some specific province and year, while total  labor costs are
appropriately measured.  As a result of this measurement error, the average labor cost per worker
in manufacturing  will be under-estimated, and  the ratio of minimum to  average wages over-
estimated.  Therefore, both the endogenous and the exogenous variable will appear to be larger
than  they actually  are, and coefficient  b2 will be over-estimated.  While the  similarity of the
elasticities obtained in three out of five specifications suggests that measurement error bias may
not be  very  relevant  in the  case  of specification (C),  more research  is needed to  check the
robustness of the results obtained for large manufacturing.
30Table  10
Impact on Wage Employment  in Large Manufacturing
Dependent  variable:  wage employment  in large manufacturing/
urban population  aged 10 and above
Explanatory  variables  (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)
Mininum  wage/average  earnings  0.0168
of urban laborers & employees  (0.807)
Minimum  wage/average  0.0135
wage in manufacturing  (0.553)
Minimum  wage/labor  costs per  0.0170
worker in large manufacturing  (1.413)
Minimum  wage/value  added per  0.0218
worker in large manufacturing  (0.791)
Minimum  wage/GDP  per worker  0.0001
excluding  oil and gas  (0.004)
Province  dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Adjusted  R 2 0.883  0.902  0.884  0.883  0.883
F test  32.76  32.95  33.24  32.75  32.52
Number of observations  132  102  132  132  132
Elasticity  (point estimate)  0.119  0.110  0.110  0.035  0.001
Elasticity  (significant  only)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
Note:  There is one observation per province per year,  as allowed by the data.  Values in parentheses are "t"
statistics.  Statistical significance is assessed at the 5 percent level for the F-test,  and at the 10 percent
level for the two-tail t-test.  All specifications include an independent term.The pattern is dramatically  different  in the case  of  small establishments  and  cottage
industries.  Because of data availability, only two of the five indicators of labor productivity can
be used in this case.  But both of them yield negative values for the coefficient b2, as shown by
Table  I  1, and the implied disemployment effects appear to be large.  Since none of the estimates
of coefficient  b2 is statistically significant, the hypothesis that minimum  wages do  not affect
employment  in small manufacturing firms cannot be rejected.  But if the obtained estimates are
taken at face value, the average elasticity of employment to the minimum wage would be -0.644,
very much in accordance with the neoclassical model of the labor market.
c)  Lay-off Requests
Lay-off requests provide an opportunity to check whether and how employment in large
firms  is  affected  by  minimum  wages.  Firms  in Indonesia  are  not allowed  to  reduce  their
personnel unless authorized to do so by the Ministry of Manpower.  Interestingly, most of the
firms that submit lay-off requests are large, as indicated by the sizable number of workers who
are affected (around 30, on average).  Smaller firms are less likely to hire permanent workers
and, therefore,  they  are also  less  likely to  resort  to  lay-offs when  they  need  to  adjust their
personnel.  Of course, changes in employment result not only from lay-offs,  but also from the
recruitment of new workers.  Nevertheless, lay-offs tend to be more prevalent when the level of
employment decreases, and less common when it increases.
It is a priori unclear whether the number of lay-offs should be treated as a function of the
level of minimum wages, or rather as a function of its variation.  The partial equilibrium analysis
introduced  in  section 3  to  discuss  the  neoclassical and  the  monopsony  cases  suggests  it is
variation that matters.  In this analysis, workers are hired or fired once and for all as employment
increases or decreases respectively.  However, firms may not adjust immediately to their optimal
31Table  11
Impact on Wage Employment  in Small Manufacturing
Dependent  variable:  wage employment
in small manufacturing  firms/
urban population  aged 10 and above
Explanatory  variables  (A)  (E)
Mininum  wage/Average  0.0125
earnings  of urban laborers  (- 0.770)
Minimum  wage/GDP  per  0.0437
capita excluding  oil  (-  1.643)
Province  dummies  Yes  Yes
Year dummnies  Yes  Yes
Adjusted  R 2 0.932  0.939
F test  23.92  26.71
Number  of observations  46  46
Elasticity  (point estimate)  -0.336  - 0.951
Elasticity  (significant  only)  0.000  0.000
Note:  There  is one  observation per  province per  year,  as allowed  by the
data.  Values in parentheses are "t" statistics.  Statistical significance
is assessed at the 5 percent level for the F-test, and at the 10 percent
level for the two-tail t-test.  All specifications include an independent
term.employment level if firing costs are significant.  In this case, short-run increases in the level of
the minimum wage may have little or no effect on lay-offs.  It is rather the cumulated effect  of
these increases over time, as captured by the level of the minimum wage, that matters.
To account for the effects of both the  level and  the change in the  level of minimum
wages, the two following versions of the employment equation are used:
Fit/Lit  =  cl +  c2 (MWit/Rit)  +  Oj  +  t  +
Fit/Lit  = cl '+  c2' A(MWitRit)  + Oi  + It + -it
where Fit is the number of workers affected by the lay-off requests submitted to the Ministry  of
Manpower in province i and year t, and Lit  is the corresponding number of urban wage earners.
The results obtained when estimating these two equations are presented in Tables 12 and
13 respectively.  The estimated coefficient c2 is negative in four of the five specifications, and
significantly so in one of them.  Coefficient c2' is also negative in most of the specifications, and
significantly so in one.  Both high minimum wages and increasing minimum wages are therefore
associated with  a  lower  number of  lay-offs, after controlling  for province-  and  year-specific
effects.  Taking into account the previous results on employment  levels (from  Table  10), it is
safe to conclude that employment  in large Indonesian firms did not suffer from the minimum
wage hikes.  If anything it increased, as predicted by the monopsony model of the labor market.
8.  The Impact  on Investment
Whether minimum wages affect investment is an issue that can be addressed using the
following version of the basic equation:
32Table  12
Lay-offs and the Level of Minimum Wages
Dependent  variable:  workers affected by lay-off  requests/
urban laborers & employees
Explanatory  variables  (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)
Mininum  wage/average  earnings  0.0060
of urban laborers & employees  (0.889)
Minimum  wage/average  - 0.0081
wage in manufacturing  (-  0.745)
Minimum  wage/labor  costs per  - 0.0001
worker in large manufacturing  (- 0.023)
Minimum  wage/value  added per  - 0.0217
worker in large manufacturing  (- 2.427)
Minimum  wage/GDP per worker  - 0.0022
excluding oil and gas  (  0.246)
Province dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Adjusted  R 2 0.589  0.802  0.817  0.835  0.632
F test  7.139  8.673  13.12  14.58  7.065
Number  of observations  134  52  80  80  134
Elasticity (point estimate)  0.616  - 0.826  - 0.008  - 0.453  - 0.173
Elasticity  (significant  only)  0.000  0.000  0.000  - 0.453  0.000
Note:  There is one observation per province per year,  as allowed by the data.  Data on  lay-offs are for period
July t-  June t+  1, while  all  other  variables  are  for  year  t.  Values  in  parentheses  are  "t"  statistics.
Statistical significance is assessed at the 5 percent level for the F-test, and at the 10 percent level for the
two-tail t-test.  All specifications include an independent term.Table  13
Lay-offs and Changes in Minimum Wages
Dependent  variable:  workers affected by lay-off requests/
urban laborers & employees
Explanatory  variables  (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)
Annual change in mininum  wage/average  0.0027
earnings  of urban laborers & employees  (0.496)
Annual  change in minimum  wage/  - 0.0003
average wage in manufacturing  (-  0.033)
Annual change in minimum  wage/labor  - 0.0004
costs per worker in large manufacturing  (-  0.142)
Annual change in minimum  wage/value  - 0.0112
added per worker in large manufacturing  (-  1.709)
Annual change in minimum  wage/GDP per  0.0018
worker excluding  oil and gas  (0.250)
Province  dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Adjusted  R 2 0.584  0.798  0.814  0.825  0.584
F test  6.984  8.457  12.78  13.64  6.965
Number  of observations  133  52  79  79  133
Elasticity  (point estimate)  0.015  - 0.004  - 0.002  - 0.014  0.004
Elasticity  (significant  only)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.014  0.000
Note:  There is one observation per province per year, as allowed by the data.  Data on lay-offs are for period July N-June
N+ 1, while all other variables are for year  N.  Values in parentheses are "t"  statistics.  Statistical significance is
assessed at the 5 percent level for the F-test,  and at the  10 percent level for the two-tail t-test.  All specifications
include an independent termn.lit/Yit = di + d2 (MWit/Rit) +  Oi +  rt  +  Pit
In this equation, Iit represents investment in province i and year t, and Y 11 is the corresponding
output level. Investment can be measured in two different ways.  Data  from national accounts
provide an accurate picture of total capital accumulation by both domestic  and foreign  agents.
Data from foreign direct investment approvals are more noisy, because some of the projects fail
to materialize, but they probably indicate how the country is perceived abroad.
The  results  obtained  when  estimating  the  equation  above  with  each  of  the  two
investment series are reported in Tables 14 and 15 respectively.  The results are somewhat more
mitigated than in the previous Tables, in the sense that the sign and size of the elasticities varies
considerably depending on the specification.  The overall effect  is most likely to be negative in
the case of total investment, however.  The average elasticity of the latter variable with respect to
the minimum wage is - 0.040 if the estimated coefficients are taken at face value, or - 0.059 if
non significant  coefficients  are treated  as zeros.  Moreover, the only  statistically significant
coefficient  in Table  14 is negative too,  and  its order of magnitude is considerable.  But the
negative effect is not so obvious in the case of foreign direct  investment.  None of the relevant
coefficients  in Table  15 is significant  indeed, which  suggests that  minimum  wages  may  not
affect the way Indonesia is perceived abroad.
9.  Conclusions
At a first glance, the results of the empirical analysis in this  paper indicate minimum
wage effects are quite moderate in Indonesia.  Wage distributions display only minor clusters of
observations  at or around the minimum wage, and for some provinces and  groups of workers
these clusters are hardly visible.  Regression analysis leads to barely significant coefficients  in
33Table  14
Impact on Total Investment
Dependent  variable: gross capital formation/GDP
Explanatory  variables  (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)
Mininum  wage/average  earnings  0.0822
of urban laborers & employees  (0.859)
Minimum  wage/average  0.0522
wage in manufacturing  (0.433)
Minimum  wage/labor  costs per  - 0.0796
worker in large manufacturing  (-  1.432)
Minimum  wage/value  added per  0.0091
worker in large manufacturing  (0.071)
Minimum  wage/GDP  per worker  - 0.2915
excluding  oil and  gas  (- 2.367)
Province  dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Adjusted  R 2 0.856  0.854  0.858  0.855  0.863
F test  26.20  21.44  26.58  25.98  27.62
Number  of observations  132  102  132  132  132
Elasticity  (point estimate)  0.105  0.076  - 0.092  0.003  - 0.293
Elasticity  (significant  only)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  - 0.293
Note:  There  is one observation per province per  year, as allowed by  the data.  Values in parentheses  are "t"
statistics.  Statistical significance is assessed at the 5 percent level for the F-test,  and at the 10 percent
level for the two-tail t-test.  All specifications include an independent term.Table  15
Impact on Foreign Direct Investment
Dependent  variable: approved  foreign  direct investment/GDP
Explanatory  variables  (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)
Mininum  wage/average  earnings  - 0.1236
of urban laborers & employees  (-  1.108)
Minimum  wage/average  - 0.2255
wage in manufacturing  (-  1.392)
Minimum  wage/labor  costs per  0.0886
worker in large manufacturing  (0.661)
Minimum  wage/value  added per  0.0315
worker in large manufacturing  (0.134)
Minimum  wage/GDP  per worker  0.0237
excluding  oil and gas  (0.145)
Province  dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Adjusted  R2 0.250  0.158  0.195  0.191  0.242
F test  2.801  1.641  2.009  1.982  2.728
Number of observations  147  83  105  105  147
Elasticity  (point estimate)  - 1.022  - 2.295  0.574  0.047  0.137
Elasticity  (significant  only)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
Note:  There is one observation per  province per year,  as allowed  by the data.  Values  in parentheses  are "t"
statistics.  Statistical significance is assessed at the 5 percent level for the F-test and at the  10 percent
level for the two-tail t-test.  All specifications include an independent term.many of the specifications, and the implied elasticities turn out to be small.  But this weakness of
the  minimum  wage  effects  should  come  as  no  surprise.  Even  in  countries  with  strong
enforcement  capabilities, like the US, these effects are not large.  The same should be true,  a
fortiori, in developing countries (see Freeman, 1993,  and Rama, 1995).
Put against this background, the mere fact that some consistent patterns emerge from the
empirical  analysis  in this  paper deserves to be highlighted.  A convenient way to summarize
these  patterns  is  to  predict  what  would  happen  to  average  wages,  wage  employment  and
investment if the government of Indonesia decided to double minimum wages once more.  This
conceptual experiment can be interpreted as a change in the minimum wage target set for  1998,
from  the  cost  of  the  KHM  consumption  bundle  to  twice  this  cost.  Needless  to  say,  the
experiment  only  yields,  at  best,  the  signs  and  orders  of  magnitude  of the  ensuing  effects.
Moreover, it implicitly assumes that current effects would be similar to those estimated for the
first half of the 1990s.
If the estimates in the paper are to be taken literally, doubling the minimum wage would
make average wages  increase by  about 10 percent, urban wage employment  fall by 2 percent,
and total investment fall by 4 to 6 percent.  Foreign direct investment may not be affected by the
minimum wage hike, but if anything it would fall.  These figures are simple averages over the
estimated elasticities with respect to minimum wages.
While the decline of total  investment suggests the economic performance of Indonesia
could deteriorate  in the  long run, wage earners as a whole would gain  in the short  run.  The
(positive) elasticity  of average wage earnings with respect to the minimum  wage is higher,  in
absolute  terms, than  the (negative) elasticity  of wage employment.  Again, taking the  figures
literally, doubling the minimum wage would increase the total wage bill by some 8 percent.  This
aggregate  gain hides important individual losses though.  Those workers who  manage to keep
34their jobs would benefit from the minimum wage hike, but others would be fired, or not hired, as
a result of it.
Disparities  are also  large  across firms.  The overall  reduction  in wage  employment
appears  to  be driven  by  small  firms,  while  large  firms  may  actually  see  their  employment
increase.  On of the striking features of the Indonesian case is that  large manufacturing firms
appear to behave as predicted  by the monopsony model of the labor market.  Consequently, in
the short run workers in these firms would gain on two counts: their wages would increase and
they would not risk losing their jobs.  These workers are therefore the only obvious winners from
the minimum wage hike.
Which policy goals can be attained by redistributing income towards workers  in large
firms?  Clearly, this kind of redistribution would not help much in terms of poverty alleviation.
In developing countries, wage earners in the modem sector are usually non-poor, and Indonesia
is no exception in this respect (see Huppi and Ravallion, 1991, and Mason and Baptist,  1996).
On the other hand, this kind of redistribution would be consistent with the goal of defusing  a
confrontational approach to industrial relations.  Workers in large firms are more  likely to get
unionized than those in small firms, so that their bitterness has potentially larger consequences.
However,  the  impact  of  the  minimum  wage  hike  on  investment  suggests  that  other,  less
distortive ways of attaining this same goal should be considered.
More generally, the results in this paper indicate the Indonesian minimum wage policy
should be revised in three directions.  First, minimum wage increases should proceed at a slower
pace than in the first half of the 1990s, hence allowing productivity gains to gradually erode the
ratio of minimum  to average wages.  Second, more attention should  be given to  local labor
market conditions,  so as to avoid penalizing  employment and  investment in provinces  where
labor productivity is much  lower than the Indonesian average.  And third, enforcement  efforts
35should  be concentrated  in large  firms only, since  these are the ones where disemployment  effects
are less likely.  A more severe enforcement  of minimum wages in small establishments,  by
contrast,  could lead to a fall in wage employment.
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38Appendix
Average Minimum Wage by Province
(in Rupiah per day)
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
D.  I. Aceh  1400  1400  1828  2133  2133  2483  2829  3413  3763
Sumatera Utara  1200  1200  1626  1930  2447  2963  3371  4088  4500
Sumatera  Barat  1000  1000  1300  1600  1750  1900  2350  3063  3513
Riau Luar Batam  1865  1865  1933  2000  2700  2700  3000  3888  4488
Riau Pulau Batam  5550  5550  5850  6750  6750  5513
Jambi  1100  1100  1100  1650  2025  2400  2650  3225  3525
Bengkulu  1300  1300  1300  1300  1650  2000  2750  3375  3763
Sumatera Selatan  1100  1100  1225  1600  1600  2242  2592  3375  3763
Lampung  1050  1050  1108  1750  1750  2450  2679  3375  3725
DKI Jakarta  1600  1600  1850  2200  2500  3000  3800  4400  5050
Jawa Barat  750  750  975  1550  1933  2200  3300  4275  5050
Jawa Tengah  780  780  780  1395  1600  1900  2525  2925  3300
Jogyakarta  700  700  783  900  1192  1425  2050  2688  3113
Jawa Timur  813  813  1012  1409  2110  2250  2813  3525  3925
Bali  1200  1200  1500  1850  2125  2500  3100  3750  4163
Nusa Tenggara Barat  650  650  921  1300  1467  1800  2213  2800  3175
Nusa Tenggara Timur  1000  1000  1150  1600  1600  2100  2267  2800  2900
Timor Timur  2000  2000  2000  2750  3600  4100
Kalimantan Barat  1400  1400  1400  1600  1800  2175  2563  3375  3725
Kalimantan  Tengah  1000  1000  1000  1200  1600  2350  2650  3463  4038
Kalimantan Selatan  950  1050  1150  1225  2275  2275  2819  3375  3725
Kalimantan  Timur  1000  1000  1200  1600  1800  2400  3038  3963  4500
Sulawesi Utara  850  850  850  1233  2000  2000  2525  3113  3250
Sulawesi Tengah  700  700  775  1017  1263  1750  2163  2675  3100
Sulawesi Selatan  1000  1000  1000  1321  1683  1750  2163  2900  3325
Sulawesi Tenggara  750  750  1033  1599  1862  2125  2631  3213  3575
Maluku  1000  1000  1467  1800  1800  2175  2633  3625  4025
Irian Jaya  1600  1700  1800  2150  2400  3408  3917  4688  5050Policy Research Working Paper Series
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